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RESUMEN 
Este documento muestra que las restricciones de liquidez reducen la creación de 
empleo incluso con mercados laborales flexibles. En un modelo dinámico de 
inversión y de demanda de trabajo con mercados de capitales y de trabajo 
imperfectos, representados respectivamente mediante una restricción en los 
dividendos, y costes de contratación y d e despido para algunos trabajadores, las 
empresas usan los contratos temporales para aliviar sus restricciones de liquidez. 
Las decisiones óptimas predichas por el modelo teórico son integradas en una 
estimación de máxima verosimilitud donde se recuperan l os parámetros de 
conducta del modelo. Los datos proceden de la Central de Balances del Banco de 
España. Se evalúan los efectos de eliminar una restricción a la vez y se demuestra 
que eliminar las restricciones financieras produce (i) una mayor creación de empleo 
que la eliminación de las rigideces laborales, y (ii) un aumento sustancial en la 
inversión de las empresas, que no ocurre si sólo se eliminan las imperfecciones 
laborales. 
Palabras clave: creación de empleo, ocupación, inversión, costes de ajuste, 
restricciones de liquidez, estimación estructural. 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper shows that liquidity constraints restrict job creation even with flexible 
labor markets. In a dynamic model of firm investment and demand for labor with 
imperfect capital markets, represented as a constraint on dividends, and imperfect 
labor markets, contained in legal firing and hiring costs applicable to some workers, 
firms use flexible labor contracts to alleviate financial constraints. The optimal 
policy rules of the theoretical model are integrated into a maximum likelihood 
procedure to recover the model's behavioral parameters. Data for the estimation 
come from the CBBE (Balance Sheet data from the Bank of Spain). I evaluate the 
effects of removing one imperfection at a time, and s how that the relaxation of 
financial constraints produces (i) more job creation than the elimination of labor 
market rigidities, and (ii) a substantial increase in firm investment, which does not 
happen if only labor market rigidities are removed. 
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1 Introduction
The removal of labor market rigidities has been the cornerstone of labor policies
in several Western European economies in the eighties. Policy measures for labor
market liberalization included reducing ﬁring costs, lowering government intervention
in wage determination and reducing unemployment transfers. In particular, most
of the observed reforms did not attempt to reduce the costs of ﬁring the already
employed, protected by strong unions, but to create a new type of contract that once
expired allows ﬁrms to costlessly lay oﬀ newly hired workers. The result of these
reforms was the emergence of dual labor markets consisting of permanent workers
that are diﬃcult to hire and especially diﬃcult to ﬁre, and temporary workers, on
probation for a ﬁx e dn u m b e ro fm o n t h s ,a f t e rw h i c ht h e ya r ee i t h e rp r o m o t e dt ob e
permanent or dismissed. Obviously, these reforms created a strong incentive for ﬁrms
to hire more temporary workers; however, the fact that ﬁrms in these economies not
only operate in imperfect labor markets, but also in imperfect capital markets further
limited the creation of permanent jobs to the extent of ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial resources.
This paper shows that ﬁn a n c i a lc o n s t r a i n t sr e s t r i c tj o bc r e a t i o ne v e nw h e nl a b o r
markets are relatively ﬂexible. While removing labor market rigidities helps ﬁrms
to create jobs and to increase capital accumulation by releasing internal resources
for investment, binding liquidity constraints hinder job creation. Using a dynamic
model of labor demand under liquidity constraints, I evaluate the dynamics of capi-
tal, debt and labor under three counterfactual scenarios: (i) no temporary workers,
(ii) elimination of hiring and ﬁring costs, and (iii) relaxation of ﬁnancial constraints.
The ﬁrst policy experiment reveals that the observed labor market reforms allevi-
ated ﬁrms’ liquidity constraints and that temporary labor did not substitute perma-
nent labor, but labor altogether substituted capital. The second experiment shows
that removing labor market rigidities would imply an initial substantial reduction in
permanent labor with an increase in subsequent periods, but it would produce a mod-
est increase in capital and a slow decrease in debt. By contrast, relaxing ﬁnancial
constraints would generate an important increase in capital accumulation, a sharp
decrease in ﬁrms’ debt and an initial decline in permanent employment followed by
an important increase. Noticeably, the level of permanent labor produced by a relax-
ation of ﬁnancial constraints would be considerably higher than the one produced by
the sole elimination of labor market rigidities.
The 1990s have been a period of intensive theoretical and empirical research on theJob Creation and Investment in Imperfect Markets. Sílvio Rendon. Mar. 2004 3
eﬀect both of labor market rigidities and credit market frictions. The ﬁrst literature
is centered in explaining the eﬀects of ﬁring and hiring costs in labor demand, par-
ticularly in Western Europe (see, for example, Bentolila & Bertola (1990), Bentolila
& Saint-Paul (1992), Hopenhayn & Rogerson (1993), Cabrales & Hopenhayn (1997)
& Aguirregabiria & Alonso-Borrego (1999)). The eﬀects of ‘eurosclerosis,’ that is,
labor markets with high ﬁring and hiring costs, are ambiguous. In good times, scle-
rotic labor markets create fewer jobs than free labor markets; however, in bad times,
sclerotic labor markets defend existing jobs better. The second literature focuses on
the eﬀects of credit market frictions on the real economy (see Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist (1999) for a survey). Under liquidity constraints the Modigliani and Miller
(1958) proposition does not hold and ﬁrms’ investment is limited by their internal
collaterizable resources. In this environment, real and nominal shocks to the economy
are magniﬁed and last longer.
These literatures do not usually refer to each other: typically, the analysis of
eurosclerosis abstracts from capital markets, whereas the analysis of capital market
imperfections does not usually consider the labor market in a meaningful way. The
present paper proposes a framework to analyze these two issues jointly.1 It is a
dynamic model where ﬁrms decide on a level of investment, permanent and temporary
labor and debt subject to ﬁnancial constraints, bankruptcy conditions and ﬁring and
hiring costs. The behavioral parameters of the theoretical model are estimated using
its policy rules as an input in a maximum likelihood procedure. These parameters
are used to perform the aforementioned policy experiments. The data come from the
CBBE (Balance Sheet data from the Bank of Spain) and include ﬁnancial variables
as well as information on permanent and temporary employment.
Among Western European countries, Spain has been the country with the largest
unemployment rate, almost 20% for more than a decade. In 1984 a labor reform
attempted to counteract the sharp increase in unemployment suﬀered during the
‘transition phase’ to a free economy. This reform basically created temporary la-
bor in Spain, so that after 1984 there was an important expansion of this type of
contract. At the same time, it is well-documented that Spanish ﬁrms face signif-
icant ﬁnancial constraints, so that ﬁnancial variables have an important on ﬁrms’
investment.(Alonso-Borrego and Bentolila 1994, Estrada and Vallés 1995) Therefore,
1There is a relatively recent and growing literature that focuses on the link between employment
and credit market imperfections (Sharpe 1994, Nickel and Nicolitsas 1999, Acemoglu 2001, Was-
mer and Weil 2002, Barlevy 2003). This literature, however, does not usually distinguish between
temporary and permanent labor, which is crucial for the European case.Job Creation and Investment in Imperfect Markets. Sílvio Rendon. Mar. 2004 4
the Spanish economy illustrates well the kind of the imperfections faced by several
European economies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section details
the Spanish regulation wage setting and for hiring and ﬁring workers. Section 3
explains the model and characterizes the optimal solution. Section 4 describes the
data and documents their basic trends. Section 5 discusses the maximum likelihood
estimation procedure. Section 6 presents the results of the estimation, the behavioral
parameters and an assessment of how well the model ﬁts the data. Section 7 performs
the three policy experiments mentioned above. The main conclusions of this paper
are summarized in Section 8.
2 Institutional Background
In the 50s and the 70s several Western European governments used dismissal costs
as a tool to discourage job destruction. However, in the 80s and 90s, confronted
to persistently high unemployment rates, these governments reduced dismissal costs
to some extent and created ﬁxed-term contracts, producing thereby the uprising of
dual labor markets. Spain is the country where temporary contracts are particularly
important, and as such provides a good illustration on how these dual labor markets
work.
In Spain, for declaring a so-called ‘fair’ dismissal a ﬁr mh a st og i v ea3m o n t h
notice before ﬁring a worker under a permanent contract and give a reason, which
can be
• disciplinary or if the worker is found incompetent, in which case the worker can
appeal and during the process he or she continues earning a salary;
• economic or technical, in which case in practice the ﬁrm has to justify that it
had continuous losses for two years.
In this case, the worker receives 20 days of monthly wage per year worked, up to
12 monthly wages. If the worker goes to court and wins, the dismissal is declared
‘unfair,’ in which case the worker receives 45 days of monthly wage per year worked,
up to 42 monthly wages. Only 15% of job terminations are settled in court, of which
73% are favorable to the workers.
Before 1984 ﬁxed-term or temporary contracts in Spain were only ‘causal,’ that is,
only applicable to seasonal jobs or to jobs replacing workers that were in maternityJob Creation and Investment in Imperfect Markets. Sílvio Rendon. Mar. 2004 5
leave. In 1984 a reform broadened the scope of temporary contracts, so they became
mostly ‘noncausal.’ In Spain, a temporary contract lasts at least six months and at
most three years. After three years of being temporary, a worker has to be either
promoted to sign a permanent contract or be ﬁred. If the ﬁrm wants to terminate the
contract before the contract length, the normal procedure applies, that is, there are
high ﬁring costs. Otherwise there is only a severance payment of 12 monthly wages
per year worked. Courts are not involved in job termination under a temporary
contract.
In Spain, unions play a crucial role in wage determination, as representation of
trade unions is independent of membership. This means that union agreements aﬀect
almost the whole labor force. Moreover, by law only the most representative unions,
two confederations, which receive public ﬁnancing, are allowed to negotiate wages.
There are practically no minority trade unions. The eﬀect of this high degree of
centralization and coordination is that wages negotiated by unions, are well above
the minimum wage: the ratio average wages/minimum wages is 31.2%. In Portugal,
with less centralization, the corresponding ratio is 42.6% (Bover, García-Perea and
Portugal 2000). Thus, wages do not adjust to speciﬁc ﬁrms’ circumstances; the
negotiation of wage increases, closely related to the CPI, is centralized.
These two aspects of Spanish labor markets, high ﬁring costs and wage rigidity,
play a crucial role in the model described in the next section.
3M o d e l
Iu s ead y n a m i cm o d e lw h e r eﬁrms maximize the expected discounted value of their
stream of dividends by choosing investment, debt, and two types of labor. It is a neo-
classical model of investment on the lines of Jorgenson (1963), extended to include
liquidity constraints and bankruptcy as in Pratap and Rendon (2003), as well as
hiring and ﬁring decisions.
3.1 Environment
The following features characterize the environment in which ﬁrms operate:
• F i r m sa r ew a g e - t a k e r sa n dw a g e sa r eg i v e n ,w h i c hi sm o t i v a t e db yaf u l l ye l a s t i c
labor supply or regulated wages.Job Creation and Investment in Imperfect Markets. Sílvio Rendon. Mar. 2004 6
• There are two types of workers, with given productivities. Flexible or temporary
workers are unskilled and rigid or permanent workers are skilled. The analysis
abstracts from the promotion structure.2
• Credit market imperfections are assumed to be exogenous and characterized by
a dividend constraint, motivated by ﬁrms having an exogenous limit for issuing
fresh equity.
3.2 The Firm’s Problem
The ﬁrm operates in a stochastic environment where it chooses a sequence of invest-













γ − I − wHH − c(H−1,H) − wLL − (1 + r)B + B
0,
that is, revenues from production which depend on capital K and on two types of
labor, rigid labor H and ﬂexible labor L, net of investment, both labor costs, ad-
justment costs of rigid labor and net debt variation. The ﬁrm’s risky environment
is captured by a total factor productivity θ that follows a Markov process P(θ
0|θ)
parameterized as an AR(1) process: θ
0 ∼ N (µ + φθ,σ2).T h e ﬁrm and the lenders
observe this productivity before making investment, employment, and borrowing de-
cisions. Technology is contained in a Cobb-Douglas production function in capital
and eﬃciency units of labor, with parameters α and β, respectively. Rigid and ﬂex-
ible labor are transformed into eﬃciency units of labor with a CES technology with
parameters γ and λ.
2The few analyses of the promotion structure from temporary to permanent employment in the
literature made so far are based on the theory of eﬃciency wages (Güell 2000) or on human capital
theory (Nagypál 2002). However, most of the research done so far simpliﬁes the analysis by assuming
two types of workers.
3In what follows, except in summations or in the likelihood funcion, variables in the current period
will not carry a subscript, variables in the next period will be denoted by ‘prime,’ and variables in
the past period will have the subscript -1.Job Creation and Investment in Imperfect Markets. Sílvio Rendon. Mar. 2004 7
Capital is accumulated following the law of motion:
K
0 =( 1− δk)K + I,
where δk is the depreciation rate of capital. The wage rate of rigid labor is wH,a n d
t h ew a g er a t eo fﬂexible labor is wL.T h e ﬁrm can adjust ﬂexible labor at no cost,
but it has to incur in hiring and ﬁring costs to adjust rigid labor. In this context, it
is sensible to assume a linear adjustment cost function for labor:
c(H−1,H)=C max[(H − (1 − δh)H−1),0] − F min[(H − (1 − δh)H−1),0]
where C is the hiring cost and F is the ﬁring cost, both in terms of unit variation
in rigid labor. Workers quit their jobs at an exogenous rate δh without producing
any cost for ﬁrms. The labor adjustment cost function captures the labor market
imperfection; the capital market imperfection is that the ﬁrm has an exogenous limit
for issuing fresh equity, that is, there is a lower bound on dividends:
D ≥ D. (1)
In the current period the ﬁrm pays debt B at interest rate r,d e t e r m i n e db o t hi n
the past period, and contracts next period’s debt B0 at interest rate r0.T h eﬁrm does
not lend money in any way, that is, it is constrained to have a nonnegative level of
debt:
B
0 ≥ 0. (2)
The ﬁrm exits the market or goes bankrupt, if its value falls below zero. In that
case, the ﬁrm cannot meet its current obligations out of their current assets and
shuts down forever. Competitive lenders, who are aware of that possibility, establish
ad e b tc o n t r a c ts ot h a tt h e ye a r nz e r oe x p e c t e dp r o ﬁts. Assuming that lenders face
an elastic supply of funds at the risk free rate ρ, the interest rate r0 charged on debt




0 − (1 + ρ)B
0 =0 ,
where π is the probability of survival. The ﬁrst term is the expected return of the
lender while the second term is the opportunity cost of the funds. This equation pins
down the interest rate and is explained below in greater detail.Job Creation and Investment in Imperfect Markets. Sílvio Rendon. Mar. 2004 8
The timing of events are the following: (i) the ﬁrm enters the period with a level
of capital K and a level of debt B contracted in the past period at the interest rate
r; and because there are adjustment costs to rigid labor, the ﬁrm needs to keep track
of the level of rigid labor in the previous period H−1; (ii) productivity θ is realized;
the ﬁrm stays in business in its value is nonnegative and exits otherwise; (iii) the
surviving ﬁrm chooses investment, new debt and the two types of labor.
Consequently, the value of the ﬁrm is determined by the following Bellman equa-
tion:








γ +( 1− δk)K − K
0











subject to (1), and (2).
In this environment the value of the ﬁrm is increasing in capital and productivity,
decreasing in total debt payments and it is ambiguous in lagged rigid labor, i. e.,
VK > 0,V H−1 S 0,V (1+r)B < 0,V θ > 0. Before deciding on the choice variables,
the ﬁrm determines an exit rule. Let the lowest productivity that leaves the ﬁrm in
business be
θ = {θ|V (K,H−1,(1 + r)B,θ)=0};
then, the exit rule implies that
if θ ≥ θ, the ﬁrm stays;
if θ < θ the ﬁrm exits.
Hence, the probability of survival next period is π =P r ( θ
0 > θ
0|θ)=1−Φ(κ0),w h e r e
κ0 =
θ0−γθ−µ
σ and Φ(.) is the normal cumulative distribution function. By the implicit

























which imply that the survival probability increases in capital, decreases in debt andJob Creation and Investment in Imperfect Markets. Sílvio Rendon. Mar. 2004 9
in the interest rate, and has an ambiguous sign for lagged rigid labor. The exit rule
is a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, that is, a ﬁrm declares bankruptcy when it cannot meet
its debt obligations but is allowed to keep ‘the tools of its trade.’
Having determined the eﬀect of the state variables on the ﬁrm’s survival proba-
















This equation gives us the supply for debt faced by the ﬁrm. Using the implicit
function theorem in this equation, one can determine that the interest rate is de-




K0Υ < 0, r0
H = θ
0
HΥ S 0,a n dr0
B0 = θ
0







1−Φ(κ0) > 0 is the inverse Mills’s ratio, which is positive as truncation
occurs from below. The interest rate ranges between ρ, if its survival were guaranteed,
and inﬁnity, if it goes bankrupt next period with certainty. The interested reader will
ﬁnd more details in Appendix A1.
3.3 Optimal Policy











γ +( 1− δ)K − K
0
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The ﬁrst order conditions for this problem are then
ZK0 = −(1 + yD)+
1
1+ρ
e EVK0 =0 ;
ZH = DH (1 + yD)+
1
1+ρ
e EVH =0 ;
ZB0 =1 + yD +
1
1+ρ
e EVB0 + yB =0 ;











ZyD = x − K
0 + B
0 − D =0 ;
ZyB = B
0 =0 ;











































and x are the ﬁrm’s internal resources determined by the state variables and the






γ +( 1− δ)K − wHH − c(H−1,H) − wLL − (1 + r)B. (4)
We have six equations to determine six variables, four choice variables and two La-
grange multipliers, which we can reduce to three. Notice that the ﬁrst order condition
for ﬂexible labor ZL is static, that is, it depends on current capital and productivity,
both state variables, and on the choice of current rigid labor. Hence, the interior











γ−1 − wL =0
o
. (5)
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that Li
θ > 0 and Li
K > 0 always;
if γ < β,t h e nL
i
H > 0 and L
i >L 0,
if γ > β,t h e nL
i
H < 0 and L
i <L 0,




Obviously, if γ = β, there is an explicit solution: Li(K,H,θ)=L0.A l s o i f γ =1 ,
there is an explicit solution: Li(K,H,θ)=L0 − H








Figure 1a illustrates the solution for L as a function of H, conditional on a produc-
tivity θ and a level of capital K.
Notice also that the ﬁrst order condition ZH =0holds only if the ﬁrm adjusts H.





C,i fH>(1 − δh)H−1,
−F,i fH<(1 − δh)H−1,
0,i fH =( 1− δh)H−1,




¯ ¯ ¯e EVH = −e EVK0 DH|c2=C
o




¯ ¯ ¯e EVH = −e EVK0 DH|c2=−F
o
,i fH<(1 − δh)H−1.
And given that DH|c2=−F >D H|c2=C,t h e nHF >H C, and the solution for rigid labor





HC,i fHC > (1 − δh)H−1,
HF,i fHF < (1 − δh)H−1,a n d
(1 − δh)H−1,i fHC < (1 − δh)H−1 <H F.
Certainly, this solution depends on the state variables and is determined simultane-
ously with capital and debt. A shorter expression for this solution is
H = min(max((1 − δh)H−1,H C),H F). (7)Job Creation and Investment in Imperfect Markets. Sílvio Rendon. Mar. 2004 12
Now, we can combine the ﬁrst order conditions that apply and write down the
three equations that determine capital, debt and rigid labor. Binding dividend and
debt constraints give rise to three possible regimes:
Regime I: yD > 0 and yB0 =0 ;
Regime II: yD > 0 and yB0 > 0;
Regime III: yD =0and yB0 > 0.
There is no Regime IV: at least one constraint must be binding.
Proposition 1 A ﬁrm cannot simultaneously incur debt and issue positive dividends,
that is, it cannot be the case that yB =0and yD =0 . Proof: In Appendix B.1.
The three regimes are then summarized by three equations:
Equation Regime I Regime II Regime III
1. D = D e EVK0 =1+ρ
2. e EVK0 = −e EVB0 B0 =0
3. H = min(max((1 − δh)H−1,H C),H F)
Once the solution is found, one can determine the Lagrange multipliers:
Multiplier Regime I Regime II Regime III
yD = −1+ 1
1+ρ e EVK0 0
yB = 0 − 1
1+ρ
³
e EVK0 + e EVB0
´
Since this model does not admit an analytical solution, the solution has to be
approximated by numerical methods. It will prove useful both for solving the model
numerically and for gaining further insights on the optimal solution, to understand
t h er e l a t i o n s h i pt h a tc a p i t a l ,d e b ta n di n t e rnal resources maintain at the optimum in
each regime. These are
Regime I: B0 = K0 − x + D>0, K0 >x− D;
Regime II: B0 =0 , K0 = x − D;
Regime III: B0 =0 , K0 <x− D.Job Creation and Investment in Imperfect Markets. Sílvio Rendon. Mar. 2004 13
This means that in general the optimal solution for debt is
B
0 =m a x
¡
K









be the optimal solutions for capital and rigid
labor in Regime I and Regime III, respectively. In Regime I, with a binding dividend
constraint, all state variables determine the solution, thus:
K
I ≡ K
I (K,H−1,(1 + r)B,θ),
H
I ≡ H
I (K,H−1,(1 + r)B,θ).
And given that in Regime III the dividend constraint does not bind, only lagged rigid













I = x − D
ª
, (9)
then in Regime II capital and labor are:
K
II ≡ x|HII − D,
H
II ≡ H
II (K,H−1,(1 + r)B,θ).
In these equations, rigid labor is determined, simultaneously with capital, from
Eq.(7), where HF and HC depend on the state variables and capital for each Regime.
In general the optimal solution for capital can be written as
K










Figure 1b illustrates the optimal solution for K0 and B0 as a function of x.T h e
three regimes are clearly distinguished: in Regime I capital is increasing and debt
is positive; in Regime II capital is increasing and debt is zero; in Regime III capital
is a constant and debt is zero. Figure 1c illustrates the optimal solution for H as aJob Creation and Investment in Imperfect Markets. Sílvio Rendon. Mar. 2004 14
function of H−1. In models of adjustment costs under free capital markets, ﬁrms with
a level of rigid labor lower than HC adjust to HC,w h e r e a sﬁrms with a level of rigid
labor higher than HF adjust to HF. However, under ﬁnancial constraints ﬁrms that
are ﬁnancially poor may not aﬀord to pay the adjustment cost. This implies that
ﬁr m st h a tw a n tt oh i r ew o r k e r so n l yh i r et oal e v e lb e l o wHC,a n dﬁr m st h a tw a n tt o
ﬁre workers can only reduce their rigid labor to a level above HF.
The following table summarizes the relationships that capital, debt and internal
resources maintain at the optimum in the three regimes:
Variable Regime I Regime II Regime III
xx − D<K K ≤ x − D ≤ KIII x − D>K III
K0 KI x − DK III
B0 KI − x + D 00
In this setup current rigid labor is a choice variable which, together with the state
variables, determines ﬂexible labor and thus the level of internal resources. Therefore,
this table is only informative about the relationship that choice variables maintain
at the optimum. In models of investment without labor or with labor in perfect
labor markets, internal resources x become a state variable themselves, in which case
this table would summarize the optimal solution. Figure 1d show how x depends on
lagged rigid labor H−1.E n t e r i n gt h ep e r i o dw i t ht o of e wo rt o om a n yr i g i dw o r k e r s
is a liability for the ﬁrm as it has to pay hiring or ﬁring costs, respectively, to reach
its optimal level of rigid workers. These costs thus create persistence in the number
of rigid workers and link this number with the ﬁnancial position of the ﬁrm: a lack or
an excess of rigid workers are both a sign that the ﬁrm’s internal resources are low.
3.4 Sequential Solution
Having characterized the optimal solution, for computational purposes it is convenient
to rewrite the problem as a sequential maximization in two stages and exploit the
connections between choice variables found above.
Stage I: Solution for capital and debt conditional on rigid labor.
Conditioning on rigid labor, we maximize the value function over capital, which
determines debt B0 by Eq. (8) and the interest rate next period r0 b yE q .( 3 ) .T h eJob Creation and Investment in Imperfect Markets. Sílvio Rendon. Mar. 2004 15
value function conditional on rigid labor H is then:


















In this maximization there is no need for Lagrange multipliers, because Eq. (8),




, takes care of the dividend and
the debt constraints. The solution for this problem is contained in the policy rule
Kw (x,θ;H). Optimal debt is obtained from this solution and Eq. (8).
Stage II: Solution for rigid labor
Using Eq. (6) and Eq. (4) we map the state variables (K,H−1,(1 + r)B,θ) and
rigid labor H to internal resources and maximize the function found in the previous
stage over rigid labor:
V (K,H−1,(1 + r)B,θ)=m a x
H
W (x,θ;H).
The corresponding solution is the policy rule H∗ ≡ H (K,H−1,(1 + r)B,θ),w h i c h
determines
L∗ ≡ L∗ (K,H−1,(1 + r)B,θ)=L(K,H∗,θ),o p t i m a lﬂexible labor, from Eq. (6);
x∗,d e ﬁned as internal resources at the optimum, from Eq. (4);
K∗ ≡ K∗ (K,H−1,(1 + r)B,θ)=Kw (x∗,θ;H∗),o p t i m a lc a p i t a ln e x tp e r i o d ,f r o m
mapping optimal rigid labor to the solution of the previous stage;
B∗ ≡ B∗ (K,H−1,(1 + r)B,θ)=m a x
¡
K∗ − x∗ + D,0
¢
, optimal debt next period,
from Eq. (8).
I compute a numerical solution for assigned parameter values by discretizing the
state space, that is, all possible combinations of K, H,a n d(1 + r)B,i n t oag r i do f
points. This procedure is explained in greater detail in Appendix A2. Notice that
Eqs (6) and (8) are used to solve for two instead of four choice variables and that the
sequential solution is faster than a simultaneous one.4
4To simplify the argument assume that all loops executed in the numerical solution have the
same size N, an integer. Then, the sequential maximizati o n( t h r e es t a t e sa n do n ec h o i c ep l u sf o u r
states and one choice) is clearly faster is than the simultaneous one (four states and two choices), as
N5 + N4 <N 6,i fN ≥ 2.Job Creation and Investment in Imperfect Markets. Sílvio Rendon. Mar. 2004 16
4D a t a
The data come from balance sheet records kept at the Bank of Spain (Central de
Balances del Banco de España - CBBE). This dataset contains 94192 observations
for more than 200 variables about the ﬁnancial structure as well as employment of
19473 ﬁrms from 1983 until 1996. I conducted a selection of the data, leaving in
the sample manufacturing private ﬁrms that do not change activity, do not merge or
split and have more than ﬁve consecutive observations. I also excluded ﬁrms with
observations that have negative or zero gross capital formation. The ﬁnal sample
consists of 1217 ﬁrms with 10787 observations. The employment information is given
in terms of permanent and temporary workers, which correspond to the categories
of rigid and permanent labor, respectively. A further description of the selection of
t h ed a t a ,t h ed e ﬁnition of the variables and the structure of the panel is provided in
Appendix A3.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the main variables in original amounts,
ratios and variations. The data for capital and debt are given in millions of pesetas of
1987, computed using the industrial price index. This table gives an idea about the
values of the variables by size, measured as thirds in the distribution of capital, and by
period: before the labor market reform (1982-1983), up to six years after the reform
(1984-1989), and 1990-1996. This period is characterized by an important growth of
capital, 3.3% by year, being the growth rate higher between 1984 and 1989, and a
decline of debt. Notice that in relative terms debt by worker is higher for the medium
sized ﬁrms, whereas the debt-capital ratio is monotonically decreasing in ﬁrms’ size.
As predicted by the model, ﬁrms with a high level of capital rely less on debt for their
ﬁnancial needs than small ﬁrms, which may be thirsty for ﬁnancial resources.
In this same period, ﬂexible labor substitutes rigid labor, and, moreover, experi-
ences a very high expansion, which is responsible for most of the expansion in total
labor in the eighties and nineties. It is noteworthy that after 1984 small and large
ﬁr m sh a v eal o w e rp e r c e n t a g eo fﬂexible labor over the total labor force than medium
sized ﬁrms. According to the theoretical model, ﬁrms with little capital demand rel-
atively less of either type of labor, while ﬁrms with large capital levels can aﬀord to
pay the labor adjustment costs and hire more rigid labor. Graphical evidence and
further discussion of these trends is provided in Section 6, which compares actual and
predicted paths of all these variables.Job Creation and Investment in Imperfect Markets. Sílvio Rendon. Mar. 2004 17
5 Estimation
The estimation consists of using the policy rules of the theoretical model as an input
in a maximum likelihood estimation. In the next subsections I explain the way that
the estimation procedure accounts for the introduction of ﬂexible labor in 1984, the
construction of the likelihood contributions, and the likelihood function maximization.
5.1 The 1984 Labor Market Reform
Because the sample starts in 1983 and ends in 1996, it covers two regimes: one with
and one without ﬂexible labor. In the estimation procedure, this is accounted for as
an unanticipated regime change, so that
Regime wihout ﬂexible labor : t ≤ 1984,
Regime with ﬂexible labor : t>1984.
I solve the dynamic programming problem two times, one for each regime: policy
rules that match data up to 1984 exclude ﬂexible labor as a choice; policy rules that
match data after 1984 do include ﬂexible labor as a choice.
5.2 Likelihood function
The log-likelihood function is the sum of the log of each ﬁrm’s joint density of the
sequence of observed capital, rigid and ﬂexible labor, and debt, conditional on the















where Lit is the likelihood contribution of ﬁrm i at time t and Θ is the parameter set.
The estimated parameter set is deﬁned as








If the random process for productivity in the theoretical model accounts for all
observed variables, the construction of the individual period-speciﬁc likelihood con-
tributions is straightforward. In that case, the likelihood contribution for period tJob Creation and Investment in Imperfect Markets. Sílvio Rendon. Mar. 2004 18
(dropping individual subscripts to improve legibility) is





θt − γθt−1 − µ
σ
¶
, t =1 ,...,Ti,
where b ψit =1 , if the model predicted variables coincide with the observables, and
b ψit =0 , otherwise. Three cases are possible
Initial period, t =1 : Since the ﬁrst observations of capital and debt are not pre-
dicted by the model, as in other panel data estimations, it is assumed that
K1 = Kobs
1 and B1 = Bobs





1 have to be produced by the state variables K1, H0, (1 + r1)B1, θ1.
However, we do not observe θ1, H0 and r1. Because we can recover the interest
rate from the function r1 (K1,H 0,B 1,θ0),w en e e dt oﬁnd the values of H0, θ0,
and θ1 that yield the observables. Finding these values means also determining
the interest rate r2 (K2,H 1,B 2,θ1) at which the ﬁrm contracts debt Bobs
2 .
Intermediate periods, t =2 ,...,T− 1: Once we know the values of Kt, Ht−1, Bt,





This productivity also gives us rt+1 (Kt,H t−1,B t,θt).
Last period, t = T: At the last period, we only need to account for the last ob-
servations of labor. Therefore, we only need to ﬁnd θT such that Hobs
T =
HT (KT,H T−1,(1 + rT)BT,θT),a n dLobs
T = LT (KT,H T−1,(1 + rT)BT,θT).
In the construction of the likelihood contributions, besides accounting for all ob-
servables (except for the ﬁrst observation of capital and debt), we obtain rigid labor
H0 and the sequences of unobservable productivities {θt}
T
t=0 and interest rates {rt}
T
t=1.
A general way of expressing the construction of b ψt is
b ψt =
(
maxH0,θ0,θ1 ψt,i f t =1 ,a n d
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A strict condition for the likelihood function not to become zero is that b ψt =1 , for all








t − Yt =0
¢
, Y = K,B,H,L.
However, with only one source of randomness in the model it is unlikely that the
likelihood function does not collapse. Even if the data were generated by the theoret-
ical model, initial parameters would not account for the sequence of observables. The
solutions proposed in the literature consist in adding extra sources of randomness,
typically measurement errors, which are introduced in the likelihood computation, not
in the theoretical model (Flinn and Heckman 1982, Wolpin 1987), or extra random
variables in the theoretical model, such as choice-speciﬁc shocks, usually following an
extreme-value distribution (Rust 1988).
The solution proposed here is to replace the requirement of choosing the un-
observed productivities that produce zero distance between observed and predicted
variables by a milder requirement: choosing the unobserved productivities that min-
imize the distance between the observed variables and the variables predicted by the
dynamic programming model. This way, whenever the observed variables do not
coincide with their predicted levels, the likelihood value does not become zero but
shrinks by a value that is proportional to the distance between the predicted variables
and their observable counterparts. Since minimizing the distance at each iteration is

















where σY for Y = K,B,H,L measures the distance between observed and predicted
variables. Thus, this procedure is basically a smoothed version of the estimation
without any additional source of randomness in the theoretical model. It does not













t=1. Any analysis of
counterfactual outcomes can use the sequence of productivities to generate alternative
sequences of observables. Moreover, if the model is well speciﬁed, maximization of
the likelihood function should produce a perfect prediction of the observables by the
model, that is, σY measure misspeciﬁcation.
The set of parameters to be estimated is Θ = {α, β, δ, γ, λ, ρ, wH, wL, C, F, φ, µ,
σ, D, σK, σH, σL, σB}, that is, the behavioral parameters and the standard deviations
of the predicted errors. For the computation of this likelihood function, I exploit the
discretization of the variables performed to solve the theoretical model (see AppendixJob Creation and Investment in Imperfect Markets. Sílvio Rendon. Mar. 2004 20
A4). The likelihood function is maximized using the Powell algorithm (Press et al.
1992) which uses direction set methods to ﬁnd the maximum. This algorithm relies
on function evaluations, not gradient methods.
6R e s u l t s
6.1 Parameters
Table 2 reports the maximum likelihood parameter estimates and the corresponding
asymptotic standard errors for two speciﬁcations: one when all parameters are esti-
mated and a second one restricting some parameter values. In the ﬁrst estimation,
some parameters are estimated at implausible values, notably ﬁring costs, which are
much higher than the values usually observed as severance payments. To correct for
this result, which comes from the absence of data on ﬁring costs, I perform a second
estimation restricting some parameters, in particular, ﬁxing ﬁring costs to their usual
value, almost half of the annual wage rate. This is the ﬁring cost for an ‘unfair’
dismissal of a worker with three years of tenure.
I nt h ef r e es p e c i ﬁcation, the capital coeﬃcient is estimated at around 0.26, whereas
the labor coeﬃcient is around 0.50. In the restricted speciﬁcation, the capital coeﬃ-
cient remains practically unchanged, but the labor coeﬃcient increases to 0.64. These
Cobb-Douglas parameters display decreasing returns to scale. The fact that both re-
sults imply that γ>β indicates sustitutability between the two types of labor. In the
restricted model, γ increases from 0.74 to 0.83, maintaining the substitution between
the two types of labor. The estimate for λ is around 0.20 in both models, that is,
ﬂexible labor is around 20% as productive rigid labor.
[Insert Table 2 here]
The depreciation parameter for capital of around 0.16 in both speciﬁc a t i o n si si n
line with previous research, whereas the rate of quits of rigid labor is 0.0054. Vari-
ations in rigid labor do not rely on quits, but on the ﬁrms’ decisions. Wage rates
of 2.0581 for rigid labor and of 0.6987 for ﬂexible labor correspond respectively to
average and minimum wages per annum in Spain. As explained above, in the un-
restricted model, ﬁring costs are high with respect to observed severance payments,
but they have to be interpreted as the total cost the employer has to pay for reducing
rigid labor. The risk-free interest rate estimated at 4.22% per annum coincides withJob Creation and Investment in Imperfect Markets. Sílvio Rendon. Mar. 2004 21
the observed one during the sample period. The autocorrelation parameter of the
productivity process is 0.88 in the unrestricted speciﬁcation and 0.79 in the restricted
version. The lower threshold on dividends is estimated at around 100 in the unre-
stricted model and around 50 in the restricted model. Clearly, imposing lower ﬁring
and hiring costs produces a reduction of the drift and volality of the productivity
process and a tighter dividend constraint. The standard deviation of the predicted
errors are low compared to the standard deviation of the four variables explained
in the descriptive section; they also coincide roughly with the implied sample stan-
dard deviations. Given that asymptotic standard errors are very low, in the next
subsections I provide an assessment of the restricted model’s ability to ﬁt the data.5
6.2 Graphical Comparison
Figure 2 reports the paths for actual and predicted average capital, debt, and rigid and
ﬂexible labor by year. The model displays good replication of the data, especially of
capital and permanent labor. The predicted path for debt ﬂuctuates around the actual
one; however, it overpredicts debt in the ﬁrst years of the sample and it underpredicts
it in the last years. This looks clearer in Figure 2c, which shows the debt-capital
ratio over time. There is an increase in this ratio from 1983 until 1985 and from then
onwards a decrease. Predicted ﬂexible labor in the ﬁrst two years is zero, because in
these years the model does not admit ﬂexible labor as a choice. In the years thereafter
predicted ﬂexible labor grows relatively faster than the actual one and the gap between
this actual and predicted variable narrows down. This trend is also clear in Figure 2d
showing the actual and predicted percentage of temporary labor over the total labor
force. These graphs are illustrative on the success of the model in replicating the
data; a more accurate assessment is provided in the following subsection.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
5I will use the also use the restricted model to assess goodness of ﬁt and to evaluate counterfactual
scenarios. As ﬁring costs are very high under the unrestricted speciﬁcation, experiments on counter-
factual scenarios produce the same qualitative results but with stronger variations in employment
and investment. The interested reader is welcome to request results based on the unrestricted model
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6.3 Goodness of Fit
To assess if the parameter estimates capture the essential features of the data, I
compare the observed and the predicted choice distributions of capital, debt and the
two types of labor. I perform goodness of ﬁtt e s t st oe v a l u a t ei ft h ed i s t r i b u t i o no f
the data can be produced by the theoretical model at the estimated parameters. The




ˆ njt ,w h e r enjt is
the actual number of observations of choice j at time t, ˆ njt be the model predicted
counterpart, J is the total number of possible choices and T is the number of years.
This statistic has an asymptotic χ2 distribution with J − 1 degrees of freedom. To
construct this statistic, I divide capital stock, debt and the two types of labor into
ﬁve quintiles each, that is, J =5 .
Additionally, I report the R2 statistic deﬁned as
R
2 =





where Yobs is the observed and b Y is the predicted variable (capital, debt, and the
two types of labor). Unlike in the linear regression framework, this statistic is not
bounded between zero and one.6
[Insert Table 3a and Table 3b here]
Table 3a and Table 3b reports the actual and predicted averages, the χ2
t and
R2 statistics by variable and by year. The average and predicted variables were
used to construct the graphs discussed in he previous subsection. The χ2
t statistic of
capital and debt for the ﬁrst year are zero because the model predicted distribution
is generated using the ﬁrst observation on capital and debt in the data. As in the
graphical comparison, the model ﬁt for capital and rigid labor is good. However, the
model does not ﬁt the debt data so well, yet the χ2 statistics fall below the critical
v a l u ea ta5 %o fs i g n i ﬁcance, except in year 1986 and 1987. For ﬂexible labor, in spite
of the systematic average underprediction of the model, the χ2 statistic is signiﬁcant
for all years. The R2 statistic shows the same ﬁgure: while capital capital and rigid
labor exhibit an R2 statistic above 0.95, this statistic is around 0.5 for debt and 0.13
for ﬂexible labor.
6Let the predicted errors be e = Yobs−b Y . Squaring and summing across observations, one obtains P
Y 2
obs =
P b Y 2 +2
P b Ye+
P
e2.A si ti sn o tn e c e s s a r i l yt r u et h a t
P b Ye=0 ,t h eR2 statistic is
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I also report the sample standard deviations of the predicted errors of each variable
in the last row of each table. Notice that they are very close to those estimated in
the maximum likelihood procedure: σK, σH, σL, σB.
7 Regime Changes
Having recovered the underlying parameters of the model and assessed its success in
replicating the data, I perform some regime changes. Starting oﬀ with the true values
1983 and 1984 and simulate the paths of the four variables under three counterfactual
scenarios from 1985 onwards: (i) there is no labor reform in 1984, that is, there
is no ﬂexible labor throughout the sample period; (ii) the reform in 1984 consists
in removing labor rigidities fully; and (iii) the reform in 1984 consists in relaxing
liquidity constraints. These experiments are useful to quantify the contribution of
ﬂexible contracts, labor market rigidities and liquidity constraints in explaining the
observed trends in the data. As explained above, I will use the estimated parameters
of the restricted model to perform this evaluation. Using the unrestricted model is
also feasible, but it exaggerates both the responses of the observed variables to the
policy experiments.
To build these counterfactual scenarios I use the sequence of predicted productivity
levels and the predicted observables in 1983 and 1984. From 1985 onwards I use
the policy rules that solve the theoretical model evaluated at parameter set that
corresponds to the new regime. The sequences of new predictions are reported in
T a b l e4a n dd e p i c t e di nF i g u r ed .
[Insert Table 4a, Table 4b and Figure 3 here]
7.1 No Flexible Labor
Figure 3a and Figure 3b graph the actual and predicted paths of the four variables,
if there had been not labor reform in 1984. The numerical values are presented in
the second column of Table 4 for each variable, corresponding to the sequence under
liquidity constraints, labor market rigidities and no ﬂexible labor. It is clear that
the observed reform did not provoke any dramatic change in any observed variable,
except in ﬂexible labor. Had the 1984 labor reform not occurred, in the following years
capital and debt levels would have been higher on average and rigid labor would haveJob Creation and Investment in Imperfect Markets. Sílvio Rendon. Mar. 2004 24
been lower on average. This indicates that the labor market reform (i) produced
substitution from capital to labor, (ii) alleviated liquidity constraints, reducing ﬁrms’
debt, and (iii) did not reduce rigid labor substantially.
7 . 2 N oH i r i n ga n dF i r i n gC o s t s
Figure 3c and Figure 3d depict the paths of the variables if labor rigidities had been
fully removed. This experiment consists in solving the dynamic programming problem
using the estimated parameters, except the ﬁring and hiring costs which are set to
zero: C = F =0 . Removing labor market rigidities would (i) produce a substantial
decrease in rigid labor just immediately after the regime change, with a recovery in the
years thereafter, (ii) have no substantial eﬀect on debt, and (iii) produce an increase
in capital. This reaction is a sign that ﬁrms have too much rigid labor, which they
would like to get rid oﬀ and they cannot because of the high costs that this would
represent.
7.3 Free Capital Markets
In the next experiment I assess the eﬀect of relaxing the dividend constraint. This
is accomplished setting D at a very low level. As shown in Figure 3e and Figure 3f,
this regime change implies (i) a substantial increase in capital accumulation, (ii) a
substantial reduction in rigid labor followed by a further increase in rigid labor, and
(iii) a substantial reduction in debt. This regime change is indicative of the potential
for increasing investment in the Spanish economy and shows that removing ﬁnancial
constraints creates more employment than only removing labor market rigidities.
Actually, once ﬁnancial constraints are relaxed, removing ﬁring and hiring costs does
not produce diﬀerent trajectories of the four relevant variables. Eurosclerosis can
persist under imperfect capital markets. A ﬁnancial liberalization can activate both
the sclerotic labor markets as well as increase investment by a big amount.
8C o n c l u s i o n s
Using a dynamic model of labor demand under liquidity constraints, I have shown
that Spanish ﬁrms use ﬂexible contracts to alleviate ﬁnancial constraints, reducing
thereby their level of borrowing. Since creation of permanent jobs is limited by owned
ﬁnancial resources, ﬁrms have to improve their ﬁnancial position to be able to hireJob Creation and Investment in Imperfect Markets. Sílvio Rendon. Mar. 2004 25
more permanent workers, reduce their demand for ﬂexible ones and their need for
debt.
A reform that removes labor market rigidities, politically unfeasible in most West-
ern European economies, would allow ﬁrms to get rid of unnecessary permanent em-
ployment, but it would produce a modest increase in investment and a slow reduction
of debt. On the contrary, relaxing ﬁnancial constraints would produce similar results
as in the previous reform, just at a higher level: it would create more permanent
employment and produce a big jump in ﬁrms’ investment as well as a big reduction
in borrowing. Policies designed to increase job creation cannot abstract from ﬁnan-
cial variables and investment and be conﬁned to labor market policy measures; they
should also be oriented toward relaxing ﬁnancial constraints.Job Creation and Investment in Imperfect Markets. Sílvio Rendon. Mar. 2004 26
Appendix
A1. Model
Endogenous interest rate.- T h ei n t e r e s tr a t es o l v e sG(r0)=0 ,w h i c hm a yn o ty i e l da















When there are multiple solutions, competition between lenders will lead to the lowest of
these rates. Since G(ρ)=−Φ(κ0)(1+ρ) < 0, if at least one equilibrium rate exists, there
is a low value of r0, such that G0 (r0) ≥ 0,i m p l y i n g1 − Φ(κ0) ≥ 1
σφ(κ0)(1+r0)θ0
r0 and
Υ > 0. Using the implicit function G(r0) we obtain the derivatives of the interest rate
function over its arguments shown in the main text.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1Suppose that yD =0and yB0 =0 . Plugging these conditions in
ZB0 one obtains
B0 =





1 − Φ(κ0)+ e Ey0
D
i < 0,
that is, debt would be negative which violates the non-negativity constraint on debt.
A2. Numerical Solution
Discretization












xx (m) m =1 ,...,N x Nx = 151 -6000 6000
θθ (s) s =1 ,...,N θ Nθ =1 1 µθ − 3σθ µθ +3 σθ
KK (k) k =0 ,...,N K NK = 31 0 3000
BB (j) j =0 ,...,N B NB = 51 0 1000
B (1 + r) e B (i) i =0 ,...,Ne B N e B = 51 0 2000
HH (h) h =0 ,...,N H NH = 31 0 1000
LL (l) l =0 ,...,N L NL = 1352 0 1350
The gridsize of each variable is the segment between the variable’s upper and lower bound
divided the number of gridpoints.7
The mean and the variance of productivity θ, which follows an AR(1) process,
7For K, B, e B, H,a n dL the gridsize is the segment between the upper and lower bound divided
by the number of gridpoints minus one. Ordinals from one to N are assigned to the gridpoints, while
the ordinal zero is reserved to express K (0) = B (0) = e B (0) = H (0) = L(0) = 0.Job Creation and Investment in Imperfect Markets. Sílvio Rendon. Mar. 2004 27
are µθ =
µ
1−ρ and σθ = σ √





=P r ( s0|s)=Φ
µ





θ(s0) − γθ(s) − ∆/2 − µ
σ
¶
where the gridsize is ∆ = 6σ
Nθ.
Solving the DP-problem
1. Compute the static rules for L, B0,a n dx.
Flexible labor: For each combination K (k), H (h), θ(s) ﬁn dt h er o o to fE q .( 6 )
and assign it to its discrete counterpart, that is, l = l(k,h,s). Negative values of L
imply that l =0 .
Debt: For each combination x(m),K0 (k0) ﬁnd B0 from Eq. (8) and assign it to the
ordinal j0 = j (m,k0)
Internal resources: For each combination K (k), e B (i), H (h), H (h−1), L(l), θ(s)
ﬁnd x from Eq. (4) and assign it to the ordinal m = m(k,i,h,h−1,l,s).
2. For each combination k0,i 0,h,s 0 create the array Vn(k0,i 0,h,s 0)=0 , n =0 .
3. Find s0 (k0,i 0,h)=a r gm i n s Vn(k0,i 0,h,s 0) s. t. Vn(k0,i 0,h,s 0) ≥ 0.





5. Equilibrium interest rate. For each combination k0,j0,h,s(j0 6=0 )
(a) Compute e B = B (j0)(1+ρ), assign it to the ordinal i0 and determine
s0
0 = s0 (k0,i 0,h).
(b) Compute r0 =
(1+ρ)
g(s0
0|s) − 1, which comes from Eq. (3).




0, keep i0 = i0 (k0,j0,h,s); otherwise set s0
0 = s0
0 +1and go back to b.
For each combination k0,h,s,s e ti0 (k0,0,h,s)=0 .
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7. For each combination k,i,h−1,supdate Vn:
Vn (k,i,h−1,s)=m a x
h
W(m,s;h),
where m = m(k,i,h,h−1,l,s) and l = l(k,h,s).
8. Go to 2, if the tolerance criterion ω is not met, that is, if
max|Vn (k,i,h−1,s) − Vn−1 (k,i,h−1,s)| > ω.
9. Policy rules:
(a) Repeat 6 and compute the solution k = k(m,s;h) for each combination m,s;h.
(b) Repeat 7 and compute the solution h∗ (k,i,h−1,s) = argmaxh W(m,s;h),w h i c h
determines the other policy rules:
l∗ (k,i,h−1,s)=l(k,h∗,s),
k∗ (k,i,h−1,s)=k(m∗,s;h∗),a n d
j∗ (k,i,h−1,s)=j (m∗,k∗),
where m∗ = m(k,i,h∗,h −1,l∗,s).
A3. Sample selection
The original information for 94192 observations of 19473 ﬁrms. The ﬁrst section excludes
ﬁrms that change activity, merge or split, have less than ﬁve observations available or that
are public or non-manufacturing. These ﬁlters leave 27704 observations of 3005 ﬁrms in the
sample, being the most important selection to exclude non-manufacturing ﬁrms, which alone
leaves 40738 observations of 7587 ﬁrms in the sample. The next most important selection
results from leaving out of the sample ﬁrms that have at least one observation with a non-
positive value of the following variables: value of production, value of net purchases, net
ﬁxed assets, gross capital formation, total outside resources-debt with providers, gross value
added, net worth, cumulative downpayment, or whose net ﬁx e da s s e t sg r o wm o r et h a nt h r e e
times. This selection leaves 10787 observations of 1217 ﬁrms in the sample.
The deﬁnitions of the variables correspond to the following deﬁnitions of the database:
Capital =Net ﬁxed assets;
Debt =Short term debt with cost;
Rigid labor=Number of workers with permanent contracts;
Flexible labor=Number of workers with temporary contracts.
Table A1 shows the structure of the panel by year. There is a relatively fair represen-
tation of all periods of interest in the sample. For 568 of the 1217 ﬁrms, that is for 48%,
there is information before and after the 1984 labor market reform. Table A2 gives an idea
of the longitudinal dimension of the panel. There is a relatively large proportion of ﬁrms
that stay in the sample for a long time: 43% of the ﬁr m sh a v e1 0o rm o r eo b s e r v a t i o n s .
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A4. Likelihood function
The construction of the likelihood function also exploits the discretization of the continuous
















Y = K,B,H,L; ι = k,j,h,l.
Then, the computation of the likelihood contribution proceeds as follows.
Initial period, t =1 : Assuming that the observations of capital and debt, characterized
by the ordinals kobs
1 and jobs
1 , are the ‘true’ ones, ﬁnd out ‘true’ rigid labor h0 and






















then b ψ1 =m a x
h0,s0,s1
ψ1 and (h0,s 0,s 1) =a r gm a xψ1,
where (k2,j 2,h 1,l 1)=( k0,j0,h,l)
¡
kobs
1 ,i 1,h 0,s 1
¢
,a n di1 = i0 ¡
kobs
1 ,jobs
1 ,h 0,s 0
¢
.T h e
likelihood contribution is L1 = b ψ1 × g (s1,s 0) and store the ‘true’ values k2, i2, h1,
and s1.
Intermediate periods, t =2 ,...,T− 1: Using the ‘true’ values of kt, it,a n dht−1, deter-
mine the current likelihood contribution.





















then b ψt =m a x
st
ψt, and st =a r gm a xψt,
where (kt+1,j t+1,h t,l t)=( k0,j0,h,l)(kt,i t,h t−1,s t),a n dit+1 = i0 (kt+1,j t+1,h t,s t).
Using st−1, compute the likelihood contribution: Lt = b ψt × g(st,s t−1) and store the
‘true’ values kt+1, it+1, ht,a n dst.
Last Period, t = T : There are no more observations for capital and debt next period;
the likelihood contribution only accounts for the two types of labor. Using the ‘true’












then b ψT =m a x
sT
ψT and sT =a r gm a xψT,
where (hT,l T)=( h,l)(kT,i T,h T−1,s T).U s i n gsT−1, compute the likelihood contri-
bution LT = b ψT × g(sT,s T−1).
Once the likelihood contributions are computed, take logs and add them up, that is,
compute the likelihood function from Eq. (11).Job Creation and Investment in Imperfect Markets. Sílvio Rendon. Mar. 2004 30
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics by period and ﬁrm size
1982-1983 1984-1989 1990-1996
Variable All Small Med. Large Small Med. Large Small Med. Large
Obs. 10787 250 346 411 1910 1778 1654 1437 1471 1530
Capital K
Average 455 36 171 1179 32 164 1127 33 160 1211
St. Dev. (741) (21) (65) (918) (20) (64) (902) (21) (65) (969)
K/N 3.18 0.68 1.67 3.37 0.80 1.86 3.47 1.07 2.44 4.02
∆K/K % 3.3 -5.6 -9.2 -4.9 3.4 5.5 4.7 -1.4 2.3 3.3
Debt B
Average 207 53 145 459 47 146 427 43 127 443
St. Dev. (282) (71) (176) (374) (70) (176) (364) (88) (162) (375)
B/N 1.44 1.11 1.68 1.40 1.20 1.67 1.31 1.40 1.92 1.47
B/K 0.45 1.64 1.01 0.42 1.50 0.90 0.38 1.31 0.79 0.37
∆B/B % 0.5 15.1 22.5 5.9 -2.2 1.7 0.7 -1.9 0.7 -1.1
Rigid Labor H
Average 123 51 92 319 34 75 281 24 51 247
St. Dev. (189) (42) (67) (282) (29) (63) (259) (24) (51) (247)
∆H/H % 0.1 -1.8 0.2 -1.2 0.5 0.6 0.7 -2.5 -0.4 -0.3
Flexible Labor L
Average 21 4 7 18 5 12 42 6 14 54
St. Dev. (60) (17) (23) (66) (9) (25) (95) (9) (22) (101)
L/N % 15.8 9.2 7.5 5.9 11.2 13.3 12.9 20.1 21.6 17.8
%(L =0 ) 32.5 61.6 54.3 45.7 47.9 36.5 28.5 28.0 19.8 16.3
∆L/L % 6.8 31.4 3.1 21.8 10.0 14.6 18.5 1.9 -0.1 -1.5
Total Labor N
Average 144 55 99 337 39 87 323 31 65 301
St. Dev. (220) (46) (68) (297) (31) (68) (300) (22) (51) (319)
∆N/N % 1.1 0.5 0.4 -0.1 1.7 2.3 2.7 -1.7 -0.3 -0.5
Note 1. Data on capital and debt are given in million pesetas of 1987.
Note 2. A ﬁrm’s size is determined by its position in the distribution of capital. Large ﬁrms
are in the upper third; medium sized ﬁrms are in the middle third; and small ﬁrms are in
the lower third of the distribution of capital.Job Creation and Investment in Imperfect Markets. Sílvio Rendon. Mar. 2004 33
Table 2: Parameter Estimates for the Unrestricted and the Restricted Model
Parameters Unrestricted Restricted
Estimates St. Err. Estimates St. Err.
Production function
α 0.2565 0.0782 0.2567 0.0345
β 0.5053 0.0996 0.6407 0.0176
γ 0.7357 0.2292 0.8332 0.0623
λ 0.1950 0.1021 0.2135 0.0557
Depreciation
δk 0.1565 0.0252 0.1555 0.0493
δh 0.0054 0.0013 0.0054
Wages
wh 2.0581 0.1532 2.0581
wl 0.6987 0.3325 0.6987
Adjustment Costs
F 8.8890 1.3004 1.0111
C 0.1056 0.0483 0.0100
Risk-free interest rate
ρ 0.0422 0.0329 0.0423 0.0031
Stochastic Process
φ 0.8826 0.0978 0.7869 0.1024
µ 1.3229 0.2189 0.8787 0.2331
σ 2.3338 0.4032 0.2935 0.0794
Borrowing Constraint
−D 100.1094 7.7664 49.0774 5.0637
Variable’s Errors
σK 142.96 5.29 175.40 23.64
σB 267.25 19.38 274.99 22.25
σH 40.81 4.25 30.27 4.25
σL 36.15 2.22 36.02 10.02
Log-Likelihood
−lnL 145495.65 163570.92Job Creation and Investment in Imperfect Markets. Sílvio Rendon. Mar. 2004 34
Table 3a: Actual and Predicted Variables
Year Capital Debt
Act. Pred. χ2 R2 Act. Pred. χ2 R2
1983 597 597 0.00 1.00 240 240 0.00 1.00
1984 511 532 3.62 1.04 258 257 26.55 0.83
1985 450 503 5.57 1.10 244 216 62.55 0.67
1986 401 447 3.79 1.09 201 191 28.93 0.77
1987 395 426 3.18 1.04 187 188 32.73 0.79
1988 401 433 3.69 0.99 183 187 48.16 0.78
1989 423 460 2.17 1.02 186 181 58.99 0.75
1990 451 484 3.86 0.99 204 174 107.42 0.61
1991 477 503 4.71 0.97 222 167 217.65 0.50
1992 475 496 2.32 0.98 223 161 248.95 0.47
1993 471 497 3.76 0.96 210 158 179.39 0.50
1994 466 488 2.01 0.95 199 144 279.26 0.45
1995 485 512 4.02 0.96 197 155 47.96 0.59
1996 531 537 2.26 0.90 198 160 66.97 0.58 √
n−1Σe2 126.13 262.38
Note. The χ2-statistic is computed using 5 bins. Critical values are: χ2
(4) =9 .49,a t5 %s i g n i ﬁcance
level, and χ2
(4) =1 4 .86, at 0.5% signiﬁcance level.
Table 3b: Actual and Predicted Variables
Year Rigid Labor Flexible Labor
Act. Pred. χ2 R2 Act. Pred. χ2 R2
1983 185 179 0.71 0.94 10 0 0.00 0.00
1984 163 147 3.13 0.88 11 0 0.00 0.00
1985 148 129 2.98 0.86 10 8 9.01 0.26
1986 131 111 5.61 0.86 12 7 0.01 0.23
1987 122 104 4.16 0.86 15 8 0.02 0.13
1988 118 100 4.86 0.87 19 8 0.04 0.10
1989 116 101 3.99 0.89 25 10 0.08 0.08
1990 116 103 8.82 0.91 24 11 0.09 0.11
1991 116 104 2.62 0.92 24 11 0.08 0.13
1992 110 101 2.38 0.92 26 11 0.06 0.10
1993 107 99 2.03 0.97 23 10 0.05 0.10
1994 105 98 0.10 0.98 24 11 0.04 0.11
1995 107 101 1.52 0.98 26 12 0.02 0.13
1996 111 109 0.23 0.96 26 14 0.04 0.13 √
n−1Σe2 41.18 35.99
Note. The χ2-statistic is computed using 5 bins. Critical values are: χ2
(4) =9 .49,a t5 %s i g n i ﬁcance
level, and χ2
(4) =1 4 .86, at 0.5% signiﬁcance level.Job Creation and Investment in Imperfect Markets. Sílvio Rendon. Mar. 2004 35
Table 4a: Regime Changes
Year Capital Debt
−D< ∞∞< ∞∞
C,F > 0= 0 ≥ 0 > 0= 0 ≥ 0
L ≥ 0= 0 ≥ 0= 0 ≥ 0= 0≥ 0= 0 ≥ 0= 0 ≥ 0= 0
1983 597 597 597 597 597 597 240 240 240 240 240 240
1984 532 532 532 532 532 532 257 257 257 257 257 257
1985 503 503 503 503 503 503 216 216 216 216 216 216
1986 447 461 444 423 518 522 191 191 177 172 22 22
1987 426 433 456 455 515 518 188 174 187 186 21 21
1988 433 458 501 483 552 555 187 176 200 191 14 14
1989 460 494 524 510 567 571 181 171 186 180 20 20
1990 484 533 568 557 608 612 174 165 179 182 12 12
1991 503 558 588 573 619 624 167 160 166 166 15 15
1992 496 550 570 556 603 607 161 147 150 150 23 23
1993 497 564 592 570 623 628 158 136 146 143 10 10
1994 488 557 577 558 591 596 144 120 127 127 10 10
1995 512 597 605 585 616 621 155 127 132 129 10 10
1996 537 626 639 626 660 665 160 136 144 144 10 10
Table 4b: Regime Changes
Year Rigid Labor Flexible Labor
−D< ∞∞< ∞∞
C,F > 0= 0 ≥ 0 > 0= 0 ≥ 0
L ≥ 0= 0 ≥ 0= 0 ≥ 0= 0≥ 0= 0 ≥ 0= 0 ≥ 0= 0
1983 179 179 179 179 179 179 0 0 0 0 0 0
1984 147 147 147 147 147 147 0 0 0 0 0 0
1985 129 126 60 65 60 65 8 0 19 0 19 0
1986 111 106 63 63 69 78 7 0 15 0 21 0
1987 104 98 63 64 72 82 8 0 17 0 20 0
1988 100 95 68 68 73 82 8 0 18 0 23 0
1989 101 100 76 76 82 91 10 0 19 0 23 0
1990 103 104 80 81 86 96 11 0 21 0 24 0
1991 104 106 82 83 87 96 11 0 21 0 25 0
1992 101 104 79 80 86 95 11 0 22 0 25 0
1993 99 101 79 76 84 93 10 0 21 0 25 0
1994 98 104 80 79 81 89 11 0 22 0 26 0
1995 101 110 86 85 89 98 12 0 23 0 26 0
1996 109 136 96 91 107 112 14 0 26 0 22 0Job Creation and Investment in Imperfect Markets. Sílvio Rendon. Mar. 2004 36
Table A1: Structure of the Panel
Year Obs. Freq. Cumulative
1983 439 4.07 4.07
1984 568 5.27 9.34
1985 688 6.38 15.71
1986 849 7.87 23.58
1987 964 8.94 32.52
1988 972 9.01 41.53
1989 959 8.89 50.42
1990 910 8.44 58.86
1991 841 7.80 66.65
1992 830 7.69 74.35
1993 767 7.11 81.46
1994 713 6.61 88.07
1995 678 6.29 94.35
1996 609 5.65 100.00
Total 10787 100.00
Table A2: Balance of the Panel
Obs. Obs. % Cum. Firms % Cum.
by ﬁrm
5 1115 10.34 10.34 223 18.32 18.32
6 1116 10.35 20.68 186 15.28 33.61
7 721 6.68 27.37 103 8.46 42.07
8 864 8.01 35.38 108 8.87 50.94
9 846 7.84 43.22 94 7.72 58.67
10 1000 9.27 52.49 100 8.22 66.89
11 1166 10.81 63.30 106 8.71 75.60
12 852 7.90 71.20 71 5.83 81.43
13 741 6.87 78.07 57 4.68 86.11
14 2366 21.93 100.00 169 13.89 100.00






















1d: x as a function of H−1
Figure 1: Policy Rules for i. Flexible Labor, ii. Capital and Debt, and
iii. Rigid Labor; iv. Mapping of H−1 on x.Job Creation and Investment in Imperfect Markets. Sílvio Rendon. Mar. 2004 38
2a: Capital and Debt
Year
 Capital Actual  Debt Actual
 Capital Predicted  Debt Predicted









2b: Rigid and Flexible Labor
Year
 Rigid Labor Actual  Flexible Labor Actual
 Rigid Labor Predicted  Flexible Labor Predicted










2c: Debt-Capital ratio: B/K 
Year
 Actual  Predicted








2d: Flexible Labor/Total Labor: L/(H+L)
Year
 Actual  Predicted
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3a: Capital and Debt: No Flexible Labor
Year
 Capital Predicted  Debt Predicted
 Capital Counterfactual  Debt Counterfactual









3b: Rigid and Flexible Labor: No Flexible Labor
Year
 Rigid Labor Predicted  Flexible Labor Predicted
 Rigid Labor Counterfactual  Flexible Labor Counterfactual










3c: Capital and Debt: No Labor Rigidities
Year
 Capital Predicted  Debt Predicted
 Capital Counterfactual  Debt Counterfactual









3d: Rigid and Flexible Labor: No Labor Rigidities
Year
 Rigid Labor Predicted  Flexible Labor Predicted
 Rigid Labor Counterfactual  Flexible Labor Counterfactual










3e: Capital and Debt: No Dividends Constraint
Year
 Capital Predicted  Debt Predicted
 Capital Counterfactual  Debt Counterfactual









3f: Rigid and Flexible Labor: No Dividends Constraint
Year
 Rigid Labor Predicted  Flexible Labor Predicted
 Rigid Labor Counterfactual  Flexible Labor Counterfactual










Figure 3: Capital, Debt, and Labor after Regime Changes: (i) No Flexible Labor,
(ii) No Labor Rigidities, (iii) No Dividends Constraint